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Abstract
With the widespread use of collaborative governance mechanisms for mitigating water pollution,
an opportunity exists to test alternative institutional designs based on collaborative governance
theory using computer simulation models, particularly when there is a clear relationship between
governance networks, observable resource allocation decisions, and measurable outcomes. This is
especially the case for wicked problems like nonpoint source water pollution where there are compelling questions regarding how best to design policies, allocate funds, and build administrative
capacity to meet water quality standards. We present an agent-based model (ABM) of water governance for the Lake Champlain Basin to simulate the impacts of alternative collaborative governance arrangements on the development of suites of water quality projects. The ABM is connected
or coupled with land use and phosphorus load accumulation models that are informed by existing
hydrologic models, project datasets, and state-set load reduction targets. We find that regionally
arranged collaborative governance in water quality project planning and implementation can lead
to better water quality outcomes, thereby affirming one of the central premises of collaborative
governance regime theory. We also find that externally mandated collaboration, as opposed to
voluntary, self-initiated collaboration, can lead to better water quality outcomes, adding to our
understanding of which type of collaborative governance arrangement is best suited to the specific contexts of this case. Further, without adequate administrative capacity in the form of human
resources located in central network actors to manage project funds, “administrative bottlenecks”
may form and money can go unspent. This research demonstrates the efficacy of using simulations of alternative institutional design for theory testing and tuning, and policy prototyping.
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of a transdisciplinary research project that studies this
social-ecological system as a complex adaptive system
(Koliba et al. 2016). Using this model, we explore and
test specific collaborative governance questions relating
to the efficacy of collaborative governance over “noncollaborative” governance arrangements (H1); the efficacy of self-initiated, voluntary collaboration versus
externally mandated collaboration (H2); the extent to
which the functional aims of collaboration (planning
and/or implementation) impacts performance (H3); and
the role that the persistence of administrative bottlenecks in the lead organization hinders mitigation (H4).
Testing and Tuning Collaborative and Network
Governance Theory

The use of collaborative governance to address environmental problems has long been documented empirically through comparative case study analysis (Imperial
2005; Koontz et al. 2010), a large-N comparative
study (Scott 2015), social network analysis (Berardo
and Lubell 2016; Knieper and Pahl-Wostl 2016), and
observed in historical assessments of eras of environmental policy, specifically found in the increased uses
of partnerships and incentives beginning in the 1980s
(Gerlak 2005). Collaborative governance theory has
been widely applied to environmental policy and governance situations and is increasingly being considered
more intentionally by policy and rulemakers (Booher
2004; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; Koontz and
Johnson 2004; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007; Scott 2015).
Collaborative governance can be realized as a form of
institutional design, leading to the question: “How best
to design an effective and usable collaborative governance platform to mitigate environmental pollution?”
Emerson and Nabatchi (2015, 18) define collaborative governance as “the process and structures of public
policy decision-making and management that engage
people across boundaries of public agencies, levels of
government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres
to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise
be accomplished.” Theories of collaborative governance
focus on the critical inputs, processes, and outcomes associated with effective collaborative governance (Ansell
and Gash 2008), the internal dynamics of collaborative
actors and nature of collaborative life cycles (Emerson
and Nabatchi 2015), and the critical challenges and exogenous factors that support or hinder effective collaborative governance arrangements (Bryson, Crosby, and
Stone 2015). Collaborative governance is said to be initiated and evolved within a “multi-layered system context,” which includes resource conditions, policy and
legal frameworks, power relations, and network characteristics (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2015, 27)
The key premise of collaborative governance regime theory is the notion that principled engagement
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(Ansell and Gash 2008; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone
2015; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015). Those advancing
collaborative governance theories often posit that collaboration among policy actors tends to produce better
results (Booher 2004; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015;
Koontz and Johnson 2004; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007), and
there is building evidence to suggest this is so (Booher
and Innes 2010; Rogers and Weber 2010; Scott 2015).
As collaborative governance networks are increasingly
pursued as key strategies to drive “collective impact”
(Kania and Kramer 2011) and improve outcomes, policymakers, rulemakers, and public managers are also
increasingly interested in questions of collaborative institutional design and operation (Kamensky 2019).
Calls for the development of experimental collaborative platforms to aid in this development through
the testing of “design rules” have been made (Ansell
and Gash 2018). While computer simulation models
have long been used to help stakeholders envision possible policy solutions, the use of simulations to model
alternative governance design arrangements using
meso-level theories of governance originating from
the field of public administration has begun to take
root (Eckerd, Campbell, and Kim 2012; Kim 2007;
Koliba, Zia, and Merrill 2019; Maroulis 2016; Scott
and Thomas 2017; Zia and Koliba 2013). Drawing on
a case involving collaborative governance design for
nonpoint source water pollution mitigation, we employ an agent-based modeling approach to test specific
design elements found in collaborative governance theories, and inform actual policy design in the process.
This manuscript highlights how an agent-based model
(ABM) constructed to simulate alternative institutional
design configurations is used to test aspects of collaborative governance theory and inform public policy. Taking
an ABM approach to modeling different institutional
designs allows us to estimate performance outcomes (in
the form of reduced phosphorus loads) relative to different design parameters. These performance outcome
estimates are determined on a regional as opposed to
local scale. With the ability to manipulate the collaborative dynamics of simulated actors (in this case municipal
and state government actors) through generating different collaborative (and non-collaborative) pathways,
the ABM platform enables the aggregation of individual
actor decision criteria to larger scales of operation, allowing for the emergence of variations in outcomes that
are contingent upon different governance designs.
The ABM highlighted here integrates spatial context
and dynamics of the collaborative water governance
system being employed and considered for the Lake
Champlain Basin (LCB) in Vermont, United States.
This water governance model and the framing of initial
scenarios were informed by stakeholder input, including
consultation with key policymakers in the LCB as part
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network actors. Network governance hinges on the efficacy of resource exchanges (Rhodes 1997) that lead to
network outputs and performance (Turrini et al. 2009).
The multi-scale, multiplex water governance network in the LCB contains a large number of actors who
possess multiple objectives and engage with one another through different types of ties (Koliba et al. 2014;
Scheinert et al. 2015). The State of Vermont has flexibility in the development and application of policies to
meet Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) targets set
by the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA).
In this framework of “pragmatic federalism” (Gerlak
2005), the state has considerable control over the shape
of the collaborative governance response by choosing
how it codifies requirements, structures (dis)incentives,
and facilitates coordination. Figure 1 illustrates possible alternative configurations of the water governance
network. In figure 1A, we show a traditional top-down,
“non-collaborative” governance structure, where
the State generates policy tools to directly manage or
incent municipal behavior through mandates, grants,
and matching funds. The edges in the network are
formed by the legal requirements for clean water actions flowing from the State (S) to all municipalities
(M), forming the basis of a typical hub and spoke or
star network. This configuration represents the current business-as-usual arrangement that involves an,
essentially, formal, non-collaborative governance arrangement. Vermont does not have strong county-level
governance, making figure 1A the norm. In figure 1B,
an alternative network structure describes regional
water districts (D) that coordinates the involvement of
municipalities and serves as an intermediary for regulation and funding streams. In this instance, we can imagine a legal framework that mandates municipalities
to participate in districts that collectively manage water
quality into the regional jurisdictions, a scenario that
was eventually enacted by the state. Within a district,
total phosphorus (TP) mitigation efforts could be prioritized at a regional scale, whereas municipal planning
and implementation capacities could be pooled at the
regional scale. Funding mechanisms (e.g., block grants)
could further take advantage of the network to reduce
the administrative burden on the state government
and on specific municipalities. Such a configuration
may create new inefficiencies in distributed governance and in principal-agent relationships. However, it
may also surface local knowledge and develop social
capital to better facilitate project feasibility. This scenario best aligns with the externally directed type of collaborative governance regime outlined by Emerson and
Nabatchi (2015). Finally, in figure 1C we see a hybrid
of A & B, with some districts in place, but direct statemunicipal interactions also present. Such a structure
may indicate a voluntary regionalization policy based
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“will produce determinations that are fairer and
more durable, robust, and efficacious” (Emerson and
Nabatchi 2015), and we may infer, lead to better performance outcomes. Most collaborative arrangements
call for the intentional use of institutional design
(Emerson and Nabatchi 2015, 69; see also Ansell and
Gash 2018; Koliba et al. 2018; Ostrom 1990) and the
utilization and exchange of resources (Emerson and
Nabatchi 2015, 73; see also Rhodes 1997; Emerson
and Gerlak 2014; Koliba et al. 2018). Across the collaborative governance literature, the role of networks
as the dominant structure shaping institutional rules
and resource exchange is fairly consistent (Bryson,
Crosby, and Stone 2015; Emerson and Nabatchi
2015; Keast and Mandell 2014; Koliba et al. 2018).
Both collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash
2008; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015) and network governance theories (Provan and Kenis 2007) project typologies relating to idealized states. Both collaborative
and network governance arrangements may be externally initiated and led, independently convened and
network administratively organized, or self-initiated
and governed through shared leadership arrangements.
Collaborative governance regime theory tends to emphasize how collaborative networks emerge, whereas
network governance theory stresses the relatively stable
structures that exist to govern goal-directed networks
(Provan and Kenis 2007; Milward and Provan 2006).
The extent to which a particular arrangement fits a given
context is a question that many theorists and researchers
in this space have asked (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015;
Keast and Mandell 2014; Milward and Provan 2006).
One of the common critiques of collaborative governance theory is the “black box” treatment of network structures in these models (Koliba et al. 2018),
despite the fact that network characteristics are viewed
as being an essential feature of collaborative governance regimes (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; Keast and
Mandell 2014). To model the structures of collaborative governance regimes, we need a more fully explicated model of network structures to empirically track
and describe resource flows over time and between organizational actors.
In network governance theory, the unit of analysis
is the interorganizational governance network. The
network is multi-layered (or multi-level) and is comprised of actors that can include public, private, and
nonprofit actors (Koliba et al. 2018; Rhodes 1997).
Network architecture allows for the explicit identification of actors as being linked or tied to other network
actors. The functions carried out by the whole network,
sub-network, or network cliques can include formal or
informal processes of principled engagement, deliberation, and decision-making. In essence, processes of collaboration unfold as interactions or exchanges between
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on a “self-initiated” collaborative governance regime
(Emerson and Nabatchi 2015), in which the propensity
of a municipality to voluntarily collaborate with others
at the regional scale can vary.
Across these three scenarios, the State (S) serves as
the central actor responsible for the distribution of
resources across the network. As the network actor
with the highest degree centrality, the resources of the
state, both in terms of financial and human capacity,
are critical to the overall performance of the network,
regardless of its configuration. Municipalities (M) rely
on state funds to pay in part for the planning and implementation of stormwater projects. The two capacities of human and financial capital are very often
coupled—as it takes human resources to process requests for funding, and limitations on funding will
predicate the number of projects that may be planned
and enacted. In essence, the resources available to the
central actor in the collaborative governance network
configurations studied here likely matters a great deal
to the performance of the whole water governance network. The degree to which the state’s human resource
capacity limits or enables the flow of funding through
each type of network is likely to matter a great deal.

To better understand how and to what extent collaborative governance arrangements work best and
under what conditions, computer simulation modeling
is increasingly being used to test and tune theory
(Johnson 1999; Schlüter et al. 2017). Recently, the notion of “collaborative platforms” has been advanced
to answer the question of “how can collaborative
governance be purposefully extended and scale-up?”
(Ansell and Gash 2018, 16). Ansell and Gash propose
the collaborative platform as a “generic organizational
logic” (Ansell and Gash 2018, 17) or as a strategy for
societal problem-solving (Nambisan and Baron 2009).
These platforms can serve one of three different functions: to explore and frame the nature of problems,
to experiment with potential solutions, and then execute specific solutions using collaborative governance
frameworks (Ansell and Gash 2018; Nambisan and
Baron 2009). In promoting the concept of collaborative
platforms, Ansell and Gash observe that “more needs
to be done to translate the logic of platforms from the
domain of technology, software development and even
organization theory to that of governance and public
administration” (Ansell and Gash 2018, 17). The use
of computer simulation models to experiment with
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Figure 1. Alternative Network Configurations of Water Governance. In panel A, the state agency directly communicates requirements and
funding to municipalities. In panel B, regional water districts act as intermediaries between state and municipal actors. In panel C, the
adoption of regional districts is incomplete, and the state must manage relationships with both districts and municipalities.
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include that same group as well as private contractors.
We expect that water districts that regionalize both
project planning and implementation will be more effective than districts that only regionalize planning. In
other words, extending the value proposition of collaboration from an “end-to-end” perspective is likely
to better amplify the positive impacts of collaborative
governance on performance.
H3: The Mandated Collaboration Hypothesis.
Mandated collaborations for planning, and for planning and implementation will generate higher nutrient
load reductions than voluntary collaboration for planning, and for planning and implementation. The results
of studies of mandated, externally directed collaboration have provided mixed results relative to the value
and efficacy of mandated collaboration. A comparative
case study of mandated health care delivery networks
by Rodriguez et al. (2007) found the mandated collaborative approach failed to enhance interorganizational
relationships, particularly in cases when there is a lack
of multiple governance mechanisms to enable wellresourced coordination. While Brummel et al.’s (2012)
study of wildland fire planning found that mandated
collaboration among service providers provided more
consistent and higher quality services because of the
ability to allow for flexibility and resource sharing. It
is clear that the specific design of the mandated collaboration is critically important. We anticipate that
mandated collaboration will allow for lower capacity
municipalities responsible for higher nutrient loads
to receive aid in their phosphorus mitigation efforts.
thereby increasing the impact of mandated collaboration arrangements. The challenges associated with the
limited capacity of particularly smaller municipalities
are a clear concern to emerge during discussions with
local municipal leaders.
H4: The Administrative Bottleneck Hypothesis.
The administrative capacity of the State (S) will be a
significant factor in load reductions results of all configurations of water governance design considered
here. Drawing on qualitative assertions made by policymakers operating in the region, as well as the logic
of coupling of financial and human resources, the administrative capacity of the State (S) to evaluate water
quality projects operates as a constraint on the allocation of resource. This assertion is supported by prior
studies of regional governance that have found that the
flow of financial resources to infrastructure projects is
hindered by a lack of administrative capacity to scope,
design, and implement projects (Milio 2007).
Case Study: Stormwater Project Planning and
Implementation in the Lake Champlain Basin

The wicked problem of nonpoint pollution provides a
context to study the relationship between alternative
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alternative collaborative designs is increasing, particularly in the experimental stages of collaborative development in which stakeholders may prototype and test
the efficacy of these governance arrangements against
performance targets. Although Ansell and Gash’s interpretation of collaborative platforms extends well
beyond the prototyping phase and into the realms of
actual implementation, we focus here on one example
of constructing and using a computer simulation
model to test the efficacy of specific collaborative governance arrangements. As we will note, stakeholder engagement around the design of the model and the use
of model output to initialize new collaborative governance arrangements (e.g., moving from experimentation
to execution) is discussed. Borrowing from Ansell and
Gash’s language, this experimental collaborative platform can test a series of alternative design rules.
To better understand which design rules are more
or less likely to be effective, we formulate a series of
hypotheses to test in our model.
H1: The Collaborative Governance Hypothesis:
Those alternative water governance arrangements that
are premised on collaborative governance designs will
generate higher nutrient load reductions than those
water governance arrangements that are not premised on collaborative designs. Findings from prior
studies of collective action problems for water governance have found that greater coordination among
governance actors leads to more effective outcomes,
underscoring the assumptions of collaborative governance regime theory that collaborative governance
leads to better outcomes (Koontz and Johnson 2004;
Scott 2015). However, other studies have found that
collaboration can sometimes reinforce existing power
relations (Scott and Thomas 2017) and lead to reduced
effectiveness. Our first hypothesis centers on whether
collaboration leads to greater phosphorus mitigation.
We postulate that greater rates of municipal collaboration in water districts will lead to greater phosphorus
mitigation.
H2: The Collaboration for Planning and
Implementation Hypothesis (H2). Collaboration in
both the planning and implementation phases of project development will result in higher nutrient load
reductions than those networks that only collaborate
around the planning of projects. Our second hypothesis focuses on the functional goals of collaboration.
In the realm of municipal stormwater management,
clean water projects, like all engineering or capital
improvement projects, must follow a clear planningto-implementation, “end-to-end” process. Planning
phases include the scoping and design of potential projects and involve the coordination of engineering firms,
public works departments, and planning offices. While
the implementation phase of stormwater projects can
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water quality problem in Lake Champlain and many
other freshwater lakes all over the world. HABs close
beaches, threaten public health, negatively impact regional economies, and reduce property values (USEPA
2018). In Lake Champlain, HABs occur most frequently during late summer in shallow bays where climate has a greater influence on nutrient mixing and
bacteria have easier access to nutrients in lake sediment (Isles et al. 2017; Zia et al. 2016). Blooms in Lake
Champlain are fed by nutrient nonpoint runoff (primarily phosphorus) from multiple sources, including
agriculture, urban stormwater, streambank erosion,
and forested land use (Lake Champlain Basin Program
2018). Each nutrient source represents a potential
target for policy tools aimed (directly or indirectly)
at reducing nutrient runoff, and ultimately bloom severity and frequency.
A TMDL regulation, put in place by the USEPA, currently regulates the maximum amount of phosphorus
that is allowed to reach Lake Champlain and still meet
water quality standards. The amount of phosphorus
reaching a waterbody is termed “load” and is measured in units of mass per time (e.g., kg/day, Mt/year)
(figure 2A). Thus, the TMDL does not directly regulate the presence of HABs in Lake Champlain, but rather one of the main causal inputs (Koliba et al. 2014).

Figure 2. One View of the LCB Water Governance System. Panel A shows the spatial distribution of TP loads at the NHDPlus catchment
scale. Panel B shows the mismatch between hydrology (broadly represented by HUC-8 watersheds), municipal jurisdictions, and the
modeled regions to which municipalities are assigned.
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institutional designs and specific outcomes, in this
case, reductions in nutrient loads. In the LCB in the
northeastern United States, challenges of nutrient pollution and harmful cyanobacteria blooms in Lake
Champlain are met by a variety of cooperating and
competing governance actors that operate at federal,
state, regional, municipal, and even international levels
(figure 2B). Collectively, these actors comprise multiscale, multiplex water governance networks (Koliba
et al. 2018; Lubell, Robins, and Wang 2014; Scheinert
et al. 2015; 2017). It is well-recognized that the multiand-cross-scale nature of environmental problems—
including water-related issues of quantity, quality, and
the degradation of concomitant ecosystem services—
requires governance approaches that themselves span
similar scales (Bodin, Sandström, and Crona 2017;
Hamilton and Lubell 2018; Koontz et al. 2010; PahlWostl et al. 2010; Scott and Thomas 2017). Yet, understanding how the actors in water governance networks
might react and adapt to novel policy or environmental
pressures (e.g., regulations, global climate change) requires dynamic modeling techniques that integrate
geographic context, spatial and temporal lags, and the
complex structure of the social-ecological network.
Harmful cyanobacteria blooms (sometimes grouped
with harmful algal blooms, or HABs) are a significant
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Agent-Based Modeling of Water Governance

ABMs have been proven to be useful tools as experimental collaborative platforms that can help policymakers make informed decisions (Ligmann-Zielinska
and Jankowski 2007). ABMs are a “bottom-up”
method of simulating the interactions among heterogenous actors and their environment, commonly in
a spatially explicit manner. Agent-based modeling has
been called “the only technique available today to formalize models based on micro-foundations, such as
agents’ beliefs and behavior and social interactions, all
aspects that we know are of a certain importance to
understand macro outcomes” (Squazzoni and Boero
2010). ABMs often reflect the dynamics in real-world
systems, including how system structures change due
to internal processes or outside disturbances (Batty
et al. 2011). One strength of ABMs lies in their ability
to simulate emergent system-scale dynamics from the
repeat interactions of individual agents on a landscape
(Parker et al. 2003). Through the application of relatively simple rules that govern individual agent behavior, patterns of collective group behavior, including
cooperation in environmental management, can
emerge (Goldstone and Janssen 2005; Scott, Thomas,
and Magallanes 2018). This ability to link multi-scale
actors, processes, and structures means ABMs are
particularly well-suited to the study of resilience and

sustainability in complex social-ecological systems
(Bitterman and Bennett 2018). For example, ABMs
have been used to study land use change in the Yucatán
peninsula (Manson 2005), the movement of elk as affected by land management practices in Yellowstone
National Park (Bennett and McGinnis 2008), the
transmission of disease across livestock production
chains (Wiltshire et al. 2019), and in common pool
resource management situations (Deadman 1999;
Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl 2007). ABMs have been explicitly used to model alternative institutional designs in
other settings including models of hazardous waste remediation (Eckerd, Campbell, and Kim 2012), school
district governance (Maroulis 2016), the diffusion of
fraudulent claims across service delivery networks
(Kim 2007), and the prioritization of transportation
projects (Zia and Koliba 2013).
In their work on Balinese water temples, Lansing and
Kremer (1993) demonstrated how simulation models
could be used to understand the relationship between
water resources and collaborative governance. Their
work showed how self-organization emerged in specific collaborative governance arrangements. Building
on this legacy, a suite of models and research programs
have emerged at this nexus of water, land use, collective decision-making, and governance. Schluter and
Pahl-Wostl (2007) developed an ABM to simulate the
resilience of different water-management institutions
to changes in environmental conditions in a semi-arid
Amu Darya river basin in Central Asia. Smajgl et al.
(2009) used an ABM to simulate water trading markets and alternative market configurations in Australia,
whereas Bellaubi and Pahl-Wostl (2017) modeled corruption in a water management system in Kenya and
Ghana. While governance actors can be modeled as
agents, their internal dynamics can have substantial
influence on collective and individual decision-making
as well, as illustrated by the ABM in Watkins et al.
(2013). Recent communications behavior-focused research has also shown how ABMs can be used to test
behavioral theories (Janssen and Baggio 2017; Bucini
et al. 2019) and how different policy-targeting can impact flood mitigation and coping (Erdlenbruch and
Bonté 2018). In many cases, ABMs are calibrated to
historical patterns (e.g., land use, migration) (Grimm
2005; Magliocca and Ellis 2013) such that the model
can be used to create scenarios of future system trajectories. When calibration targets are sparse or unavailable, or when the subject of the study is novel, ABMs
are commonly more “stylized” and used not for prediction, but to improve understanding of system dynamics. In this study, the alternative water governance
regime embodied by districts in Vermont would be
novel to this system. Thus our ABM is conceived as a
stylized, exploratory model grounded in collaborative
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USEPA used a physics-based SWAT (Soil and Water
Assessment Tool) model (Arnold and Fohrer 2005)
combining land use, hydrological, and erosional processes to estimate the contribution of various land
uses in a spatially explicit manner across the LCB
(figure 2A).
On June 15, 2015, Act 64, colloquially the “Vermont
Clean Water Act,” was signed into law to address
degrading water quality in Lake Champlain and its
tributaries. The law set forth new rules for managing
water quality in the state, including restrictions on
agricultural practices and permitting processes for existing and new development. It created the Clean Water
Fund, a pool of financial resources to be distributed by
the state to fund projects related to clean water goals.
Subsequently, on June 6, 2018, Act 76 was signed into
law outlining the expectations to design and implement
a system through which every watershed in the LCB
be assigned a Clean Water Service Provider (CWSP)
to provide regional coordination of non-regulatory
water quality improvement projects (Vermont General
Assembly 2019). These new CWSPs would coordinate
actions to collectively develop clean water priorities
and to apply for state funding. While implementation details are not yet finalized, this collaborative
governance arrangement is in part due to the findings
stemming from the sharing of these modeling results.

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2020, Vol. 30, No. 4

Materials and Methods
An adaptive management perspective guided the development of this governance ABM (Norton 2005), with
a key feature of this approach being the pursuit of collaborative learning between social and natural scientists and policymakers and other stakeholders (Daniels
and Walker 2001). At the start of this project, the research team undertook a series of focus groups and
interviews with key informants in the LCB, and source
document analysis of major pieces of legislation, rules,
white papers, and TMDL memorandums of understanding. This phase of research was used to develop
a qualitative appreciation of the multi-level governance networks operating in this region. A Policy and
Technical Advisory Committee (PTAC) met with the
research team at regular intervals to inform the model
development. Observations about model assumptions,
data sources, and intended uses of model outputs were
made, summarized and drawn on by the research team.

Additional data were collected through a survey that
went out to all municipalities across the State (Clark,
Hurley, and Koliba 2018).
As detailed in figure 3, the coupled (connected)
model platform has three primary components: (1) a
land use model that places municipal stormwater projects on the LCB landscape, (2) a simplified load accumulation model, and (3) the ABM of networked water
governance. Communication among model components is facilitated by an infrastructure that tightly
couples the models at an annual timescale, meaning
that the land use, phosphorus load, and governance
models can generate outputs that can be aggregated
across specific and consistent scales of temporality.
Within the ABM, agent–agent interactions occur at
sub-annual intervals. Agent–environment interactions
occur when municipalities or districts react to the state
of the environment and make decisions that lead to the
creation of stormwater projects, which are then instantiated on the simulated landscape. When implemented,
these projects differentially affect annualized phosphorus loads that accumulate to the lake. The changes
in loadings are read by the governance actor agents,
affecting their behavior in future timesteps and closing
the environment-agent portion of the feedback loop. In
addition to the modeling framework shown in figure 3,
the Overview Design Concepts, and Details (ODD)
model specification (Grimm et al. 2010) for the ABM
is included in the Supplementary Material. The ABM
framework is built upon the MASON Multiagent
Simulation Toolkit (Luke et al. 2005) and its extension
GeoMason, which provides additional geospatial support capabilities.
Together, the ABM, land use, and load accumulation
models trace the lifecycle of clean water projects as they
proceed from an initial state of unknown/unplanned to
a final state where the project is implemented on the

Figure 3. Generalized Schematic of the Coupled Model. The Coupler is a software architecture that facilitates communication among
connected models—in this instance the governance ABM, the land use model, and the phosphorus load accumulation model
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governance theory and not subject to model validation expectations. We purposefully simplify agent
decision-making process and have not, for example, included political or legal motivations of behavior. Given
these assumptions, the simulations explore model sensitivity to policy-relevant inputs.
While the above models capture many of the key
dynamics that can be found in watershed governance,
a gap remains in modeling the translation of policy
objectives to policy tools in a manner that is both
spatially explicit and incorporates environmental feedbacks. Effective reduction of nonpoint pollution has
proven to be extremely difficult. The extent to which
these difficulties stem from challenges associated with
the design and operation of explicit water governance
networks is the subject of this study.
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capacity corresponds to the number of projects they
can take from concept to a “shovel ready” state that is
ready to be funded. The distribution of municipal planning and implementation capacity parameters were estimated using empirical data from the VTANR CWIP
database. We estimated each municipality’s implementation capacity by calculating the annual mean number
of projects it completed over the last 4 years (the length
of the dataset). As data for planned, but not funded,
projects are currently unavailable, we assume that
planning capacity is twice that of implementation capacity. Additional parameter estimation details can be
found in the supplemental ODD protocol. Municipal
agents randomly select among unplanned projects in
their boundaries, representing the (at times) disordered
process of managing multiple priorities from various
constituencies and interest groups. Agents then use
their planning capacity to “discover” properties of the
project (e.g., estimated load reduction potential, estimated implementation cost, location) in a simulated
planning process. Municipal agents then rank planned
projects according to prioritization criteria. We follow
a simplifying assumption that municipal agents seek to
maximize utility by prioritizing projects that provide
the greatest load reductions per dollar. All municipal
agents follow this institutional rule logic, maximizing
project efficiency as defined in equation (1).
municipal
capacity

(1)
est. phos. reductioni
max
est. implementation costsi
i= 1

Once projects are planned, they are passed to the state
agency agent to be ranked and funded (see below),
then passed back to their corresponding municipality.
Unfunded projects are queued, and funded projects are
available for implementation. Municipal agents then
rank funded projects according to equation (1), again
optimizing for load reductions per dollar. The top n
projects are then implemented, where n corresponds to
an agent’s implementation capacity. Projects that are

Table 1. Variables and Functions Governing Behavior of Municipal Agents
Variable

Description

Range

Planning capacity
Implementation
capacity
TMDL load
reduction target
Probability of
collaboration

The number of clean water projects a municipality can plan in a year.
The number of clean water projects a municipality can implement in a year.

2–14
1–6

Target value of phosphorus load reduction for urban land use in the municipality to meet
TMDL. Estimates generated by EPA. (kg/year)
The probability that a municipality will collaborate with other municipalities in regional water
districts. Empirical distributions generated using survey data of municipalities in the Lake
Champlain Basin.
The algorithm used by municipal agents to rank projects prior to submitting them for funding
and before implementation.

15.4–1,179.7

Prioritization criteria

0–1
NA
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landscape. When municipalities utilize their projectplanning capacity, they may coordinate with other
actors to prioritize clean water projects according to
their individual characteristics (e.g., available capacity)
and rules put in place by policy. The state agency agent
evaluates and prioritizes projects, allocating funds and
utilizing its state-level capacity. Finally, agents implement projects “on the ground,” affecting land use and
fulfilling the lifecycle of a project. Once agents implement clean water projects, these changes to the landscape are then translated to the environmental model,
affecting the amount of phosphorus reaching Lake
Champlain.
The ABM simulates the interactions among three
agent types: municipalities (i.e., towns and cities), regional water district agents, and state agencies in the
LCB. Each municipal agent represents one of the 126
Vermont towns or cities whose centroid falls within
the Vermont portion of the LCB. Eight regional water
district agents each correspond to actual regional planning district (RPC) boundaries, with each municipal
agent assigned to its corresponding geographic region.
Due to our focus on the CWIP process, we simplify
interactions among multiple government agencies by
using a singular state agency agent that is tasked with
improving water quality and managing the allocation
of public funds. Within each annual timestep, municipal agents may: (1) plan clean water projects, (2)
prioritize projects, and (3) implement projects. When
undertaking each of these steps, real-world municipalities are subject to dynamic budget and staffing
constraints, regulatory requirements, and public will.
We have simplified municipal decision-making and resource constraints to five key municipal variables and
functions (table 1).
The objective of a municipal agent is to reduce
the amount of phosphorus load generated by land
use within its borders to the target level specified by
the “reasonable assurance” scenario generated by the
USEPA during the TMDL process (US Environmental
Protection Agency 2016). A municipal agent’s planning

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2020, Vol. 30, No. 4

Table 2. Mean of Probability Distribution for Each
Municipality in a Region
Region

Mean

Chittenden
Addison
Central
Rutland
Lamoille
Bennington
Northwest
Northeastern

0.671
0.585
0.568
0.545
0.521
0.500
0.429
0.298

Note: Regions derived from Regional Planning Commission
(RPC) jurisdictions in the LCB.

criteria from equation (1). This agent’s capacity to
evaluate projects is a scenario-driven parameter and
corresponds to its throughput, or the number of projects it can evaluate in an annual timestep. Finally, the
state agent sets the rules of the CWIP action arena,
thereby affecting the allowed behavior of municipal
and regional agents (table 3). The final class of agents
is regional facilitators that, depending on policy scenario, coordinate the planning and implementation of
municipal agents at broader scales. We model these
agents on RPCs and utilities, but the framework can
be scaled to other geographic extents (e.g., watershed
boundaries) or network configurations.
The land use model provides a bridge between governance actions and water quality impacts. This connection takes the form of the clean water projects that
are planned, prioritized, funded, and implemented by
municipalities in the LCB. While each municipality is
itself a governance actor in the ABM, each is also connected to a spatial feature corresponding to its municipal boundaries. Empirical data from VTANR were
used to generate a realistic set of possible projects for
the simulation. Additional detail can be found in S7.2
of the Supplementary Appendix.
The environmental model is a simplified load accumulation model based on an EPA-created SWAT model
(Arnold and Fohrer 2005; Gassman et al. 2007) that
calculated average annual phosphorus contributions
to Lake Champlain (US Environmental Protection
Agency 2016). As projects are implemented on the
landscape, the contribution of phosphorus to the lake
is reduced in a spatially explicit manner. This simplified
model excludes nutrient transport and the role of climate and assumes all phosphorus eventually reaches
the lake. The resultant model is a simplified representation of nutrient export from the landscape (S7.1 of
the Supplementary Appendix). However, the relative
lack of complexity reduces computational overhead
while isolating the effects of governance dynamics on
the landscape.
Through collaboration with policymakers at state,
regional, and municipal scales, we identified a set of
scenarios that included alternative policy configurations, state-level capacity, and funding allocations to
explore via simulation. The scenarios that alter policy
rules (table 3) modify the degree and geographic scale of
cooperation among municipal and regional water district agents. In the current state of this social-ecological
system, municipalities are statutorily required to individually meet regulatory and non-regulatory load
reductions and must participate in clean water improvements, but have a choice as to whether work directly with the state (figure 1A) or engaged in mandated
collaboration with other municipalities in their region
to form a district (figure 1B). This second scenario also
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funded but not implemented are returned to the corresponding municipal agent’s implementation queue.
Once municipal agents have met their phosphorus reduction targets, they stop all activity.
In some scenarios (described below), state policy
is altered to mandate collaboration among municipal agents at a regional scale. Stakeholder anecdotes
drawn from focus groups suggest that regional cooperation varies greatly among regions and their constituent municipalities. This is confirmed by a 2017
survey of Vermont municipalities (Clark, Hurley, and
Koliba 2018) that drew on responses to determine the
probability that a municipality will collaborate with
their regional planning commission (RPC) along four
dimensions: (1) information sharing, (2) technical assistance, (3) sharing human/physical assets, and (4)
receipt of monetary support. This survey was sent to
all 249 municipalities in Vermont, with a response rate
of 55% across Vermont, and 64% of those municipalities in the LCB. Each municipality’s response was
coded 1/0 for yes/no, then summed to estimate a “coordination capacity score” for each municipality. An
empirical distribution was generated for each region.
At the state scale, these scores follow a normal distribution, though distributions vary at the regional scale.
Accordingly, we estimate the distribution for each region in the simulation and normalize to the interval
[0,1]. In those scenarios where policies allow for regional coordination, we sample from these distributions and assign a probability of collaboration for each
municipality. Mean values are shown in table 2.
At the state level, the responsibility of water policyrulemaking primarily falls on the state Vermont
Division of Environmental Conservation (DEC).
Accordingly, we model a second agent type representing a state agency tasked with managing water
quality. This singleton agency agent takes allocated
funds, evaluates municipal projects, and ranks funding
priorities as specified by policy scenarios. The state
agent prioritizes projects using the same efficiency
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Table 3. Scenario Parameters Include Coordination Policies (District Function), Resource Levels (Funding and
Capacity), and Landscape Configuration
Resource Parameters
Parameter

Coordination policies
Water district function
No district
Voluntary planning district
Mandated planning district
Voluntary implementation and planning district
Mandated implementation and planning district

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 million USD
50, 75, 100, 125, 150, 200 and 225 projects/year
5 alternative distributions of projects on landscape
1. No district
2. Voluntary planning district
3. Mandated planning district
4. Voluntary planning and implementation district
5. Mandated planning and implementation district
Municipal aggregation rule

Aggregated planning?

none
probability-based
all in region
probability-based
all in region

no
optional
yes
optional
yes

Aggregated
implementation?
no
no
no
optional
yes

Note: Each coordination policy is composed of rules that govern municipal and regional behavior.

regionalizes planning capacity but imagines a policy
tool that mandates municipal participation (probability of coordination = 1). A third scenario is posited
in which municipal agents have chosen to voluntarily
cooperate with others in the region or not (figure 1C).
The voluntary participation of municipalities is probabilistic, according to table 2. The fourth and fifth
scenarios extend the previous scenarios to also include
collaboration for project implementation. Again, voluntary and mandated policies allow for different levels
of participation. These scenarios approximate a regional utility authorized to regulate the municipalities
in its jurisdiction. In some scenarios, collaboration is
mandated by the state agent, and regional facilitators
manage all municipal planning and implementation in
their jurisdiction.
In addition to alternative policy scenarios, we
modify the capacity (financial and human resources)
of the state agency agent to evaluate and allocate funds
to stormwater projects (table 3). The State is tasked
with evaluating and prioritizing the projects identified
by municipalities. Administrative capacity bottlenecks
may emerge at the project evaluation stage because the
State retains approval of all projects. A constrained administrative capacity can limit the throughput of the
approval and funding to municipalities leading to reduced load reductions on the landscape. Further, as
Acts 64 and 76 are implemented and as state, regional,
and local capacities come online, there is uncertainty
in the amount of funds that should be optimally allocated to the problem. At a most basic level, if funding
is low, loads will likely remain high. However, if too
much money is allocated and there is insufficient

capacity to implement projects, the funds sit unused.
In our scenarios, we alter the throughput of the state
agent and the overall fund allocation to explore these
dynamics. The parameters are based on past project
funding data and were developed in consultation
with agency stakeholders. In total, we simulate 1,225
scenarios. Model stochasticity is introduced in (1) the
generation of projects, (2) the selection of projects by
municipalities to plan, (3) municipal participation in
regional cooperation, and (4) the initialization of municipal capacity. A simulation runs for 50 model years,
and each scenario was repeated for 30 Monte Carlo
iterations.
Results
Hypothesis 1, the Collaborative Governance
Hypothesis, and hypothesis 2, the Collaboration for
Planning and Implementation Hypothesis, are closely
related. We expect collaborative policies to perform
better than non-collaborative policies, and we further
expect that collaboration across several stages of project planning and implementation will perform better
than partial efforts. We first compare the overall efficacy of the different collaborative governance design
scenarios by comparing the cumulative load reductions
for each scenario over the full simulation period. As
shown in figure 4, the most effective (highest cumulative reduction) design was the creation of mandated
planning and implementation districts. The voluntary
planning and implementation districts perform nearly
as well, followed by act alone, mandated planning
(only), and voluntary planning (only) districts in that
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Allocated funds
State agent capacity (throughput)
Initial landscape configuration
Coordination policy

Values
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greater load reductions, specifically when resources are
relatively high, and both planning and implementation capacity are shared. Additional analysis confirms
three-way interactions among policy, funding, and capacity scenario parameters (table 4).
The mixed findings of H1 are relevant for evaluating
the Collaboration for Planning and Implementation
Hypothesis. Our findings very clearly prove H2—the
coupling of collaboration for planning and implementation—leads to more efficacious outcomes. In our simulations, municipal water districts that only collaborate
around planning functions are the least effective (as
measured by cumulative load reductions) collaborative
governance scenarios. These results are explained by a
spatial mismatch between planning and implementation capacities caused by the newly enabled structure

Figure 4. Box-and-Whisker Plots of Cumulative Load Reductions. Panel A shows all scenarios by policy, obscuring the differences among
policies at various funding and capacity levels. Panel B shows little differences among policies at low capacity and funding levels, whereas
panel C shows that at higher levels of funding and capacity, reductions are greater in policies where both planning and implementation
capacity are aggregated.
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order. The difference among outcomes was confirmed
to be significant by a Kruskal-Wallis test (p < .001).
The clustering of outcomes shown in figure 5A is a result of multiple scenarios with similar levels of funding
and state-level capacity. However, statistically significant differences (p < .001) among collaborative governance scenarios hold when controlling for funding
and capacity. In figures 4B and 4C, we see how differences in policy efficacy change as funding and capacity
are increased. There is little difference among policy
outcomes at low resource levels, whereas disparities
become evident as resources increase.
While these findings partially confirm H1, our results are mixed with respect to the lower efficacy in
policies that incentivize regionalized planning schemes.
Collaborative arrangements only sometimes lead to

647

648

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2020, Vol. 30, No. 4

of the water districts. Because planning capacity is regionalized at the district level, but implementation capacity is not, projects can be identified and planned in
areas where there is insufficient ability to implement
them. Essentially, municipalities can become “overplanned” when the number of to-be-implemented projects exceeds a municipality’s implementation capacity.
The regionalization policy creates a new bottleneck at

the implementation stage. We measure the depth of this
backlog using the average number of projects that have
been planned and funded—but not implemented—for
each collaborative governance scenario.
The municipal-scale bottleneck becomes increasingly apparent in scenarios with greater state-level
capacity (table 5). As the state processes additional
projects, municipal capacity is exhausted, and the
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Figure 5. Load Reductions as a Function of Policy, Funding, and Capacity Scenarios. Response is generally nonlinear, as the amount of
funding has little effect in lower capacity scenarios.
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we performed the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance of each group individually, reported
in table 6. This Table should be read as what percent
more effective is the mandated policy in mitigating TP
loads than the voluntary policy? We find that in all
cases, the mandated policy performs better among the
low-capacity, high-loads municipalities (all comparisons significant at p = .01). The relative effectiveness
of the mandated policy does not always improve as
state-level resources increase. This is sensible given that
the prioritization schemes in both policies optimize for
load mitigation independent of resource constraints.
To confirm our findings, we also compared policy mandates among municipal agents with low-capacity and
low TP loads (not shown here). In this alternative case,
the result was the opposite, as the voluntary policy
performed better (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = .01). This
is also as expected, as low-load areas are disfavored in
a collaborative scheme, independent of local capacity.
Thus, those municipalities with relatively low TP loads
can improve their local conditions by not collaborating
under a voluntary policy regime.
Our fourth hypothesis, the Administrative
Bottleneck Hypothesis, tests whether the human resource capacity at the state scale (as indicated by
the number of projects that State administrators can

Table 4. Analysis of Variance of Interactions Among Model Input Parameters

Policy
State-level capacity
Funding
Policy:Capacity
Policy:Funding
Capacity:Funding
Policy:Capacity:Funding

df

Sum Sq.

Mean Sq.

F

p (>F)

4
1
1
4
4
1
4

1.5e11
3.7e11
1.2e10
4.3e10
2.3e9
1.4e10
2.9e9

3.6e10
3.7e11
1.2e10
1.1e10
5.7e8
1.4e10
7.1e8

40,214.9
413,945.0
13,168.5
11,972.6
628.6
15,584.4
792.9

<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

Table 5. Project Implementation Backlogs, Measured as the Mean Number of Projects that are Funded but Unable
to be Completed due to Constraints on Implementation Capacity
State Agency Evaluation Capacity

Policy
scenario

50

75

100

125

150

200

225

Compete

1.24 (0.26)

Voluntary planning

13.00
(2.70)
5.42 (1.64)

1.89
(0.52)
19.09
(4.59)
8.56
(2.50)
1.73
(0.44)
1 (0.00)

2.95
(0.99)
23.42
(6.78)
11.88
(3.62)
2.73
(0.87)
1 (0.00)

3.90
(1.50)
25.57
(8.21)
14.72
(4.86)
3.80
(1.42)
1 (0.00)

5.51
(2.59)
27.44
(9.54)
17.93
(6.66)
5.03
(2.12)
1 (0.00)

10.33
(6.91)
33.62
(14.32)
24.18
(10.66)
9.24 (5.65)

12.88
(9.33)
37.41
(17.47)
26.59
(12.43)
12.03
(8.22)
1
(0.00)

Mandated planning
Voluntary planning
and implementation
Mandated planning
and implementation

1.18 (0.21)
1 (0.00)

1 (0.00)

Note: SDs in parentheses. Differences among regionalization policy, state evaluation capacity, and funding levels (not shown here) confirmed
to be significant (p < .001).
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implementation backlog increases. The backlog of delayed projects is much larger (confirmed by analysis of
variance [ANOVA], p < .001) when planning capacity
is regionalized separate from implementation capacity,
resulting in lower efficiency in the planning-only regionalization scenarios. The issue is exacerbated as
capacity (throughput) of the state agency agent increases. Here, planning capacity, implementation capacity, and prioritized policy targets (greater required
load reductions) are mismatched spatially and temporally. Therefore, the regionalization hypothesis is supported only when that mismatch is reduced.
Hypothesis 3, the Mandated Collaboration
Hypothesis, tests how municipalities with low operational capacity but high TP loads are affected by
an externally initiated mandate to collaborate. To test
this case, we created a subset of municipal agents possessing both low capacity (implementation capacity ≤
1) and the highest 20% of TP loads. Given the implementation bottlenecks discussed above and illustrated
in table 5, we only tested differences between the mandated and voluntary planning-and-implementation
policies. In the mandated policy, we expect that in
aggregate the mitigated loads will be greater, as municipal agents with greater capacity can “lend” their
resources to low-capacity collaborators. Accordingly,
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phosphorus mitigated. However, we also see in Panel B
that as capacity increases, the effectiveness of spending
(kg / $1,000) decreases. This is a result of the prioritization process—as the governance network implements additional clean water projects, it necessarily
funds more marginal projects, shifting the distribution
and lowering return on investment.
Discussion
Our model findings generally support the supposition
that designing for collaborative governance leads to
better performance outcomes in the form of reduced
phosphorus loads, affirming H1. We also find that H2,
the Collaboration for Planning and Implementation
Hypothesis to be affirmed, as well as the Mandated
Collaboration Hypothesis (H3). These findings are
likely intuitive in cases where all capacities and objectives are aggregated, and processes are optimized using
collaborative governance mechanisms and norms. In
these scenarios, the policy essentially structures the
collaborative governance regime as a scale-based linear
optimization that maximizes utility at a broader scale.
While a useful benchmark, this type of governance requires the participation of all finer-scale entities (here,
municipalities) that is only achieved through mandated collaboration. These results also support the
Administrative Bottleneck Hypothesis (H4) in which
we see the value of matching the administrative capacity of the State to levels of funding.
As the real-world policy reality deviates from a
mathematically optimal configuration, the resultant
social and environmental outcomes are less predictable. For example, voluntary participation scenarios
led to lower reductions in load reductions and lessefficient spending of funds. Further, new bottlenecks
and project backlogs were created by planning-only
districts at the municipal level, again leading to lessefficient performance. We can conclude, therefore, that
the system is not strictly dependent on scaling effects—
rather, collaborative design considerations of how and

Table 6. The Relative Performance of The Mandated Planning-and-Implementation Policy Over the Voluntary Policy
State-Level Capacity (Projects/Year)

Annual funding (in millions of dollars)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

50

75

100

125

150

200

225

22.9
22.7
18.5
20.5
23.5
17.2
11.2

13.4
20.2
22.0
19.3
15.6
23.8
13.3

13.9
19.3
20.7
24.9
23.1
19.8
11.2

23.1
26.6
21.8
20.5
23.4
18.0
20.6

23.2
27.8
23.8
18.5
22.2
26.1
20.4

23.3
20.5
31.5
15.2
31.7
24.2
21.2

22.5
24.1
22.5
33.6
29.0
35.5
37.4

Note: Values in the table are percentages, and should be read, for example, as “the mandated policy on average mitigates 22.9% more load
than the voluntary policy”. All comparisons confirmed significant by a Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance.
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process) constrains the efficacy of the program and the
allocation of funds. When measured using the cumulative load reductions funded by alternative collaborative governance scenarios, we find this to be the case.
Interactions among policy, capacity, and funding were
confirmed by the ANOVA results (table 5). We plot
these interactions among policy, capacity, funding, and
load reductions in figure 5. Load reductions in all collaborative governance scenarios exhibit some degree
of non-linear response, as indicated by the surfaces on
the left-hand side of the figure. In general, when the
state’s human resource capacity to evaluate projects
is relatively low (less than 100 projects/year) the effects of additional funds are minimal. For example, in
scenarios that model a voluntary planning district with
a capacity of 100 projects/year, our model indicates
that that increasing funding from 1 to 7 million dollars
will result in little-to-no change in load reductions. As
capacity increases, however, additional funds do lead
to greater TP load reductions. The locations of thresholds differ by active policy but are generally found in
the 100–150 projects/year range in this model. The
response surface for planning-only districts is fairly
flat, indicating a less-responsive system. Planning-andimplementation districts, on the other hand, respond
more strongly to changes in capacity and clean water
funding. The “act alone” scenarios fall in between. The
relationships among load reductions, funding, and
state capacity support the bottleneck hypothesis.
Finally, we can also explore the suite of options
available to policymakers from the perspective of
overall “bottom-line” performance indicators. As we
have shown, load reductions respond strongly to statelevel capacity. A likely question within VTANR may be
“what is the right level of staffing (capacity), and how
might we measure the effectiveness of our actions?” In
figure 6, we plot two alternative metrics for planningand-implementation districts against various levels of
state capacity. In Panel A, we see that as human resource capacity to evaluate projects increases, so does
a performance metric based on the total kilograms of
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where to regionalize governance capacity is important
in achieving goals as well.
These findings demonstrate the complex trade-offs
that can surface when collaborative governance mechanisms are employed. Collaboration for collaboration’s
sake is not a panacea. Our model results demonstrate
that the links between planning and implementation,
and the need for administrative capacity to address
bottlenecks are critically important considerations.
Our model indicates that the efficacy of instituting
a collaborative governance approach to municipal
stormwater management is highly dependent on the
capacity of the state agency agent to evaluate clean
water projects and allocate funds. The parameter
ranges for our scenarios are based on empirical data
from the Vermont DEC clean water projects database, which shows that approximately 57 urban land
use projects are funded annually (VTDEC 2019). Our
simulations show that significant increases in state capacity will have greater immediate impacts than shortterm increases in funding. As shown in figure 6, system
response to an increase in capacity is non-linear. Across
all modeled scenarios, at lower capacity levels (100
projects/year or less), funding can increase by 700%
and the response of the policy target (i.e., load reductions) remains flat, as the system cannot utilize all of
the funding from the state. Though increased capacity
and funding improve the state’s ability to process projects, this model holds municipal (and regional) capacity constant. Thus, additional resources eventually
shift a bottleneck from the state agent to the municipalities (or to their regionalized districts). The values
in figure 6 heatmaps point to possible “sweet spots,”
or combinations of capacity and funding levels that

could lead to more efficient policy outcomes. While
the assumptions and simplifications in the model limit
normative predictions, the model allows for the exploration of alternative scenarios with stakeholder input.
The ability of the water governance ABM to both
test hypotheses and provide some practical considerations to policymakers offers us a unique ability to
test variations of collaborative governance theory. This
study contributes to the growing body of research that
has demonstrated the efficacy of collaborative governance arrangements to address wicked environmental
problems (Booher 2004; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015;
Koontz and Johnson 2004; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007;
Scott 2015). This assertion is rendered at a coarse-grain
level, as found in Hypothesis 1. The variation of differences between collaborative and non-collaborative designs is measurably higher, but not always decidedly so.
The non-collaboration scenario illustrated as the star
network found in figure 1A provides an opportunity
for municipalities to directly access resources from the
state. The lack of any intermediaries that may provide
buffers against the state may place greater burdens
on municipalities to “fend for themselves.” For municipalities with higher capacity to plan and implement
stormwater projects, these arrangements provide them
greater ability to comply with water quality standards.
But as we have noted, the problem locations or drivers
of nonpoint source pollution are not evenly distributed,
driving the potential for projects with lower returns
on investment to get implemented over other projects.
Pooling resources and aggregating project planning
and implementation at the district scale should lead
to higher net load reductions. However, this was not
the case for either voluntary collaboration scenarios. In
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Figure 6. Metrics of Policy Efficacy for Planning-and-Implementation Districts. As capacity increases, amounts of mitigated phosphorus
increase, but per-dollar efficiency decreases.
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Although we cannot anticipate or model all possible
futures or conditions, the examination of various configurations of collaborative governance platforms can
increase learning and adaptive capacity (Ansell and
Gash 2018; Daniels and Walker 2001; Emerson and
Gerlak 2014). As we have seen, not all collaborative
governance schemes may lead to desirable outcomes.
Thus, the value proposition of collaborative governance is very likely contingent upon the specific design
of the collaboration network.
Conclusion
With the nuances of modeling complex governance
arrangements recognized, there are a number of key
observations to make relative to some of the core questions that concern public managers and policymakers.
The first conclusion is one that is well-trodden, but
here is empirically validated, is that you simply cannot
“throw money at the problem” of nonpoint source
pollution. A rush to fund at the expense of proper
planning, targeted focus, and appropriate levels of
administrative capacity can leave a system rich in financial capital, but poor in knowledge, human and
physical capital, and ultimately, results.
The second main conclusion to be drawn here pertains
to the importance of administrative capacity. The kind of
process-based modeling demonstrated here can be very
useful in determining where and how administrative
bottlenecks occur, and their relation to program performance. Strategic investments in administrative capacity are
critically important, and an assertion that is likely not lost
on practicing public managers. This fact may, at times, be
lost on policymakers who are setting the policy agenda
and making resource allocation decisions. ABMs and
other process-based models of alternative governance design can be used to inform policy decisions and ensure
that administrative capacity is dully considered.
The third main conclusion to be drawn pertains to
designing for collaborative governance and the efficacy of collaborative and network governance theories
to inform this process. The apparent inefficiencies of
voluntary collaboration at both the planning and implementation stages are worth noting again. When
agency is provided to actors such as municipal agents
at a finer, localized scale, their limited perceptions of
the whole system and the collective goals tied to that
system, may be lost in the specifics of local politics,
resource constraints and the like. The apparent value
of mandated collaboration, not just in planning, but in
project implantation as well, suggests the need to “level
the playing field” by pressing for stronger coordination
across scales of government. In this regard, our study
provides some very important insights regarding mandated versus voluntary collaboration.
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this case, voluntary collaborative governance regimes
for planning alone and planning and implementation both scored lower mean load reductions than the
non-collaborative scenario. We should judge this particular outcome not as a generalizable outcome, but
as a property of the particular relationship between a
municipality’s propensity to collaborate and the geospatial distribution of nonpoint pollution. This finding
should rather be explained as a specific set of contingencies shaped by municipal willingness to collaborate
and the geophysical properties of the environmental
problem. By incentivizing or motivating municipalities to increase their propensity to collaborate, we
may find that load reduction measures would increase.
Mandating collaboration for the planning and implementation of stormwater projects leads to generally
higher levels of load reductions because it allows for
a stronger prioritization of projects with higher ROIs.
These findings suggest that in the context of
nonpoint pollution mitigation, at least, the efficacy
of collaboration governance regimes is contingent on
the specific properties of both institutions and ecosystems (Raab, Mannak, and Cambré 2013). Taken more
broadly, we can conclude that in circumstances when
governance networks carry out specific regulatory and
capital-intensive projects that the use of collaborative
governance regimes should be considered as contingent upon actor’s propensities to collaborate and the
administrative capacities of central actors. This latter
point highlights the importance that network structures play in determining the optimal collaborative
governance regime type. Here, the properties of the
network matter, signaling the need for deeper integration of collaborative and network governance theories.
The contributions of this study to theory development include the demonstration of the relationship
between network governance and collaborative governance. As noted earlier, there is compatibility between collaborative governance typologies of origins
and network governance typologies of relatively stable
governance design. Future theory development should
focus on the relationship between specific structural
properties of networks and collaborative capacity.
The ability of social-ecological systems to be resilient is contingent on their ability to adapt and transform as conditions change (Folke et al. 2002; Gallopín
2006). There is congruence among dimensions of collaborative governance and adaptive capacity theories,
suggesting that as institutions enable collaboration,
their ability (and that of the system) to adapt may be
increased (Emerson and Gerlak 2014).
This study demonstrates the value that ABMs can
have for theory testing and institutional design and
contributes to the growing literature regarding the use
of simulation modeling to test alternative design rules.
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